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THE FACTS
On February 17, 1992, police found the body of Ruth Dickie in her apartment in
Arlington County, Virginia. She had been stabbed to death and her assailant had at-
tempted to rape her. Six months later, Angel Francisco Breard was apprehended in the
course of an attempted rape in Washington, D.C., and also became a suspect in Dickie's
murder, for which he was subsequently indicted. As summarized in the appellate review
of Breard's conviction by the Supreme Court of Virginia,
[at] trial, Breard testified in his own defense. He stated that, on the night of February
17, 1992, he left his apartment armed with a knife because he thought he would
"try to do someone," meaning that he "wanted to use the knife to force a woman
to have sex with [him]." Breard admitted that he engaged Dickie in conversation
on the street, followed her to her apartment, argued with her, and forced himself
into her apartment. Breard also admitted that he stabbed Dickie, removed her
pants, and got "on top of her." While he was on Dickie, he heard someone knocking
on the door. He "got scared," opened a kitchen window, jumped to the ground,
and fled. Breard also testified that, at the time, he believed that he was under a
curse placed upon him by his ex-wife's father.1
Hair, blood and other bodily fluid samples found at the scene of the crime were subjected
to enzyme testing and DNA analysis. All the samples matched Breard's typing. After a
jury trial, Breard was found guilty on June 24, 1993. He was sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment and a fine for the attempted rape and condemned to death for the
murder. The execution was set for February 17, 1994, but was stayed pending appeals.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the'judgment on June 10, 1994, rejecting
Breard's challenges to the death sentence, the constitutionality of the trial court's review
of the death sentence, jury matters, the guilt phase, the penalty phase and the sentence
review.2 Breard petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
which was denied.3 On June 29, 1995, the Circuit Court of Arlington County denied
Breard's state petition for habeas corpus.4 The Supreme Court of Virginia refused his
petition for appeal onJanuary 17,1996,5 and denied his petition for rehearing on March
1, 1996.6
On April 25, 1996, Breard filed a motion in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in which he raised, along with various other new issues, an
international legal claim based on violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963.7 Article 36(1) (b) of the Convention provides that,
if [the accused] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed
'Breard v. Virginia, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1994).
2 Id. at 074-82.
3 Breard v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 971 (1994).
4Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
5 Id.
6id.
7 Id. For the Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, see 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261.
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to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall
also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.
Breard had not made such a request; nor had the authorities of Virginia informed him
of the option, as required by the Convention.
The Paraguayan consular authorities in the United States did not learn about Breard's
arrest and trial until some time in 1996. At that point, a series of discussions with the
United States Department of State took place. The Department undertook an investiga-
tion and came to the following conclusions:
Breard had almost immediate and thereafter continuing contact with his family,
who were involved in his defense;
Breard could not have been ignorant of American culture, as he had lived in this
country since 1986 and had been married briefly to a United States citizen;
Breard had a good command of English and therefore would not have needed
consular assistance in interpretation;
Breard was ably represented by criminal defense attorneys experienced in death
penalty litigation, who worked closely with his family, some of whom traveled from
Paraguay to assist in the defense;
Breard decided to plead not guilty and to testify at his trial contrary to the
competent advice of his attorneys, who were far better able to explain the U.S. legal
system to him than any consular officer would have been;
Breard's mother, who was also Paraguayan, understood that Breard's decision to
plead not guilty and to testify was a strategic error and advised him not to do what
he did, and so it was implausible that cultural misunderstandings accounted for his
decision;
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Breard unquestionably committed the
crime, and that the jury and judge could easily have imposed the death penalty
even if Breard had not testified, given ample evidence that the murder was "aggra-
vated" within the meaning of Virginia law; and
Breard had the full protection of the criminal justice system.8
On July 7, 1997, the State Department acknowledged that the non-notification of
the consular authorities was a breach of the Convention and apologized for it. This
communication did not satisfy the Paraguayan authorities, and the possibility of referring
the matter to the International Court ofJustice was broached. In February 1998, Paraguay
informed the United States of its intention to approach the Court, without being specific.
In the meantime, Breard argued the international legal issue in the federal district
court. On this point, the district court held:
Virginia's persistent refusal to abide by the Vienna Convention troubles the Court.
However, a violation of rights under the Convention is insufficient to permit §2254
relief. . . . In any event, Petitioner never raised this issue in state court. Therefore,
the claim is defaulted and federal review is barred ...
Petitioner argues that the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the Vienna
Convention provides just cause for the default. However, the Commonwealth's fail-
ure to comply with the Vienna Convention did not prevent Breard's counsel from
raising the issue during state proceedings. The only predicate fact required to raise
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (Nos. 97-
1390, 97-8214).
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the claim was the knowledge of Breard's foreign nationality. The legal knowledge
required to raise the claim is imputed to Breard through the various attorneys
who represented him during the trial, direct appeal, and state habeas proceedings.
"Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the
petitioner's agent acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the
petitioner must bear the risk of any attorney error."9
In September 1996, the Republic of Paraguay, its Ambassador to the United States
and its Consul General to the United States initiated a separate action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking a declaration of treaty
violation, a vacaturofBreard's conviction and sentence, and an injunction against further
violations of the treaty.10 The district court found that Paraguay and its officials had
standing to bring their claims under the Convention (and the Paraguay-U.S. Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation), emphasizing that Paraguay was asserting its
own rights and not those of Breard, and that the Ambassador had standing to maintain
a claim against the Virginia officials under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983,
because he was a "person" within the meaning of the Act. But the court decided that
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the claimants were not alleging a
"continuing violation of federal law" and therefore could not bring their claims within
the exception to the immunity of states under the Eleventh Amendment permitting
prospective remedies.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the
Eleventh Amendment precluded its jurisdiction, concluding that the various exceptions
the courts had carved in it did not apply to this case. It stated:
We share the district court's expressed "disenchantment" with the Common-
wealth's conceded past violation of Paraguay's treaty rights. . . .There are dis-
turbing implications in that conduct for larger interests of the United States and
its citizens. But, we conclude that because the violation of federal treaty law was not
ongoing when this action was filed, nor the relief sought prospective, the Eleventh
Amendment does not permit the federal courts to provide a remedy against the
Commonwealth officials sued in this action for their conceded past violations."
Breard pursued his own appeal to the Fourth Circuit. To Virginia's contention that
he had procedurally defaulted whatever rights he had under the Vienna Convention,
Breard responded "that he had no reasonable basis for raising his Vienna Convention
claim until April 1996 when the Fifth Circuit decided Faulder v. Johnson,' which held
that an arrestee's rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated when Texas
officials failed to inform him of his right to contact the Canadian Consulate. Breard also
argued that he could not have raised his Vienna Convention claim because Virginia had
failed to advise him of his rights in that regard. The Fourth Circuit, however, had earlier
rejected the claim that a state's failure to advise a petitioner of his rights under the
Vienna Convention could constitute cause for failure to raise the claim in state court,
3
because "a reasonably diligent attorney would have discovered the applicability of the
Vienna Convention to a foreign national defendant.' 4 The court of appeals stated:
9 Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. at 1263 (citations omitted).
10 Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996), affld, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
"1134 F.3d at 629 (citation omitted).
1 
2 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct 1352 (1998)
(citing Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 487 (1996)).
13 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997).
14 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 619-20.
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The Vienna Convention. . . has been in effect since 1969, and a reasonably diligent
search by Murphy's counsel, who was retained shortly after Murphy's arrest and
who represented Murphy throughout the state court proceedings, would have re-
vealed the existence and applicability (if any) of the Vienna Convention. Treaties
are one of the first sources that would be consulted by a reasonably diligent counsel
representing a foreign national. Counsel in other cases, both before and since
Murphy's state proceedings, apparently had and have had no difficulty whatsoever
learning of the Convention."
Because the court of appeals felt that Breard could demonstrate neither a cause for the
default nor actual prejudice as a result of the failure to invoke the Vienna Convention,
Murphy foreclosed the issue.
Although the court of appeals issued a unanimous decision, Judge Butzner added a
concurring opinion, "to emphasize the importance of the Vienna Convention.' ' 16 He
wrote:
The Vienna Convention is a self executing treaty-it provides rights to individuals
rather than merely setting out the obligations of signatories. . . . The text empha-
sizes that the right of consular notice and assistance is the citizen's. The language
is mandatory and unequivocal, evidencing the signatories' recognition of the impor-
tance of consular access for persons detained by a foreign government.
The provisions of the Vienna Convention have the dignity of an act of Congress
and are binding upon the states. . . . The Supremacy Clause mandates that rights
conferred by a treaty be honored by the states. . . . The provisions of the Conven-
tion should be implemented before trial when they can be appropriately addressed.
Collateral review is too limited to afford an adequate remedy.
The protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far beyond Breard's case.
United States citizens are scattered about the world-as missionaries, Peace Corps
volunteers, doctors, teachers and students, as travelers for business and for pleasure.
Their freedom and safety are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor
the Vienna Convention and other nations follow their example. Public officials
should bear in mind that "international law is founded upon mutuality and reci-
procity ...... . ..
The State Department has advised the states, including Virginia, of their obligation
to inform foreign nationals of their rights under the Vienna Convention. It has
advised states to facilitate consular access to foreign detainees. Prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike should be aware of the rights conferred by the treaty and
their responsibilities under it. The importance of the Vienna Convention cannot
be overstated. It should be honored by all nations that have signed the treaty and
all states of this nation.1V
Appeal was sought to the U.S. Supreme Court. Meanwhile, on April 3, 1998, Paraguay
filed an Application in the International Court ofJustice instituting proceedings against
the United States. In that Application, Paraguay alleged the breach of certain provisions
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, notably Article 36, paragraph 1(b). In
the Application, Paraguay asked the Court to adjudge and declare a violation of the
Convention, especially its Articles 5 (relating to the consular functions) and 36,18 and
to declare "that Paraguay is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum [meaning a retrial
Id. at 620 (quoting Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100).
' Id. at 621.
17 Id. at 622 (citations omitted).
" Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 8.
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of Breard], and. . . that the United States is under an international legal obligation
not to apply the [domestic] doctrine of 'procedural default' or any other doctrine of its
internal law, so as to preclude the exercise of the rights accorded under Article 36." 19
The Court was also asked to declare that any criminal liability imposed on Breard in
violation of international legal obligations was void and should be recognized as void by
the legal authorities of the United States; that the United States should restore the status
quo ante, that is, reestablish the situation that had existed before the detention of,
proceedings against and sentencing of Breard in violation of the legal obligations of the
United States; and that the United States should guarantee to Paraguay that: the illegal
acts would not be repeated.
Simultaneously, Paraguay filed a request for the indication of provisional measures of
protection under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.0 It requested that the United
States Government take the necessary measures to ensure that Breard would not be
executed pending the disposition of the case; that the United States Government inform
the Court of the actions it took in pursuance of that request and the results of those
actions; and that the United States Government ensure that no action would be taken
that might prejudice the rights of Paraguay with respect to any decision the Court might
render on the merits of the case. Paraguay also asked the Court to treat the request for
provisional measures of protection as a matter of the greatest urgency.
On receipt of those documents, the Acting President notified the parties of the need
to act in such a way as to enable any order the Court might make on the request for
provisional measures to have its appropriate effects. Public hearings were held on
April 7.21 The United States argued that Breard had admitted his guilt, a point Paraguay
did not dispute, and while acknowledging that he had not been informed of his rights
under the Vienna Convention at the time of the trial, the United States insisted that the
omission was not deliberate. Nevertheless, the Government continued, Breard had all
necessary legal assistance, he understood English well, and the additional assistance of
consular officers would not have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Moreover,
Article 36 notification is "unevenly made" and when a claim for failure to notify is
lodged, the only remedy is apology. Neither the language of the Vienna Convention,
nor its travaux prtparatoires nor state practice supported a penalty of invalidation of the
proceedings-and return to the status quo ante. Furthermore, such a remedy would be
quite unworkable.22 As for the actions of the United States, it alleged that "the State
Department had done everything in its power to help the government of Paraguay as
soon as it was informed of the situation," but that "a stay of executioi depended
exclusively on the United States Supreme Court and the Governor of Virginia. In any
case, because Breard had not been prejudiced by the omission and his case was not
likely to succeed on the merits, provisional measures should not be indicated. 4
19Application of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), para. 25 (Apr. 3, 1998) (http://ivww.icj-cij.org)
[hereinafter ICJ Web site].
20 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE STATUTE, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993.
21 For the transcript, see Court Oral Pleadings, Docs. CR 98/7 and 98/8, ICJ Web site, supra note 19. The
Court was in session at the time, being engaged in its deliberations on another case. Later that evening, the
parties agreed on the written procedure. The Memorial and Counter-Memorial were to be filed on June 9
and September 9, respectively. The expectation was that the Court would hear the merits in the fall. Paraguay,
however, later requested an extension, and on June 9 the Acting President substituted October 9 and April
9, 1999, for the deposit of these two pleadings.
2 Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures,
paras. 18, 20 (Order of Apr. 9, 1998), ICJ Web site, supra note 19.
2 Id., para. 19.
2'1d., para. 20.
[Vol. 92:666
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At the close of oral argument, the Acting President announced that the Order con-
taining the Court's decision would be read at a public sitting on Thursday, April 9. In
that Order, the Court rejected the U.S. claim that there was no prima faciejurisdiction,
25
explaining:
Whereas the existence of the relief sought by Paraguay under the Convention can
only be determined at the stage of the merits; and whereas the issue of whether
any such remedy is dependent upon evidence of prejudice to the accused in his
trial and sentence can equally only be decided upon at the merits;
. . . the Court finds that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction . 26
Because the planned execution of Breard within that very week "would render it impossi-
ble for the Court to order the relief that Paraguay seeks and thus cause irreparable harm
to the rights it claims, ' 27 the Court found "that the circumstances require it to indicate,
as a matter of urgency, provisional measures." 28 Accordingly, it unanimously indicated,
as provisional measures, that "[t]he United States should take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in
these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken
in implementation of this Order."
29
The Court, it may be noted, seemed at pains to indicate that it was not trying to
expand its jurisdiction into new areas:
[T]he issues before the Court in this case do not concern the entitlement of the
federal states within the United States to resort to the death penalty for the most
heinous crimes; and. . . further, the function of this Court is to resolve interna-
tional legal disputes between States, inter alia when they arise out of the interpreta-
tion or application of international conventions, and not to act as a court of
criminal appeal.3"
President Schwebel and Judges Oda and Koroma appended declarations.
On April 13, the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia, requesting
that the Governor suspend the execution:
The United States has throughout vigorously defended Virginia's right to go
forward with the sentence imposed on Mr. Breard by Virginia's courts. Counsel for
the U.S. Government argued strongly before the International Court that the Court
should not issue the relief sought by Paraguay. We maintain, for the reasons we
presented to the Court at its hearing last week, that consular notification would not
have changed the outcome and that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
does not require that Mr. Breard's conviction and sentence be vacated.
The International Court, however, was not prepared to decide the issues we raised
in its urgent proceedings last week. Using non-binding language, the Court said
that the United States should "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings."
The Court concurrently set an expedited briefing schedule in the case, apparently
intending to hold its final hearing this fall.
In light of the Court's request, the unique and difficult foreign policy issues, and
other problems created by the Court's provisional measures, I therefore request
'Id., para. 32.
Id., paras. 33-34.
7 Id., para. 37.
Id., para 39.
Id., para. 41.
Id., para. 38. The ICJ set a briefing schedule for the case, with oral argument likely to be held in
November 1998.
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that you exercise your powers as Governor and stay Mr. Breard's execution. It is
only with great reluctance that I make this request, especially given the aggravated
character of the crime for which Mr. Breard has been convicted and sentenced and
our view of the merits of Paraguay's legal claims. As Secretary of State, however, I
have a responsibility to bear in mind the safety of Americans overseas.
I am particularly concerned about the possible negative consequences for the
many U.S. citizens who live and travel abroad. The execution of Mr. Breard in the
present circumstances could lead some countries to contend incorrectly that the
U.S. does not take seriously its obligations under the Convention. The immediate
execution of Mr. Breard in the face of the Court's April 9 action could be seen as
a denial by the United States of the significance of international law and the Court's
processes in its international relations and thereby limit our ability to ensure that
Americans are protected when living or traveling abroad.'
The Departments of State andJustice submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court
urging the Court to deny a writ of certiorari and a stay. With respect to the interim
measures of the International Court, the Departments contended:
As to the purportedly binding effect of the ICJ's order, there is substantial dis-
agreement among jurists as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional measures
is binding. . . . The better reasoned position is that such an order is not binding.
Article 41(1) of the ICJ statute provides that the ICJ shall have "the power to
indicate any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either [party]." Article 41 (2) further states that, "pending the final decision
[of the ICJ], notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties
and the Security Council." The use of precatory language ("indicate," "ought to
be taken," "suggested") instead of stronger language (e.g.: the ICJ may "order"
provisional measures that "shall" be taken) strongly supports a conclusion that ICJ
provisional measures are not binding on the parties. The distinction in Article 41 (2)
between the "final decision" ultimately foreseen and the "measures suggested" in
the interim also suggests that the "measures suggested" are not binding.
Petitioners have relied on the United Nations Charter to argue that provisional
measures are binding, but the language of the Charter does not support that conclu-
sion. Article 94(1) provides that "[e]ach member * * * undertakes to comply with
the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party." (Emphasis added.) "The
decision," in the context of Article 94(1) of the Charter, evidently refers to the
final decision of the International Court. Article 94(2) of the Charter elaborates
that "if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it by a
judgment rendered by the [ICJ], the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council." (Emphasis added.) Significantly, the Security Council has never acted to
enforce provisional measures indicated by the ICJ ...
Moreover, the ICJ itself has never concluded that provisional measures are binding
on the parties to a dispute. That court has indicated provisional measures in seven
other cases of which we are aware; in most of those cases, the order indicating
provisional measures was not regarded as binding by the respondent. . . .The ICJ
did not, in any of the final decisions in those cases, suggest that the failure of the
respondent to comply with the indication of provisional measures had violated the
court's earlier order.
"Finally, even if parties to a case before the ICJ are required to heed am order of
that court indicating provisional measures, the ICJ's order in this case does not
require this Court to stop Breard's execution. That order states that the United States
"should" take all measures "at its disposal" to ensure" that Breard is not executed.
31 Letter from Madeleine YL Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia
(Apr. 13, 1998).
CVol. 92:666
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The word "should" in the ICJ's order confirms our understanding, described above,
that the ICJ order is precatory rather than mandatory. But in any event, the "mea-
sures at [the Government's] disposal" are a matter of domestic United States law,
and our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's ability to interfere
with the criminaljustice systems of the States. The "measures at [the United States']
disposal" under our Constitution may in some cases include only persuasion-such
as the Secretary of State's request to the Governor of Virginia to stay Breard's
execution-and not legal compulsion through the judicial system. That is the situa-
tion here. Accordingly, the ICJ's order does not provide an independent basis for
this Court either to grant certiorari or to stay the execution.
3 2
On April 14, 1998, the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 3, denied the
petition for habeas corpus and the petitions for certiorari. The Court found that Breard
had "procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the Vienna Convention by failing
to raise that claim in the state courts' '3 and rejected, on two grounds, the contention
by both Breard and Paraguay that the Vienna Convention claim should still be heard in
a federal court because the Convention is the supreme law of the land and, as such,
trumps the procedural default doctrine. First, the Court reasoned that the procedural
rules of the forum state govern the implementation of a treaty in that state, unless the
treaty prescribes otherwise. In the Court's reading of the Vienna Convention, no such
contrary intention could be discerned. Second, the Court reasoned that the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 precludes a habeas petitioner from raising
alleged violations of treaties of the United States if those allegations had not been
developed in state court proceedings. Thus, the Court reasoned, even if Breard had a
right under the Vienna Convention, the subsequent act of legislation would have pre-
cluded his raising it at this phase. Nor was the Court persuaded that a hearing would
have yielded a different outcome:
Even were Breard's Vienna Convention claim properly raised and proven, it is
extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final
judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on
the trial. . . .Breard decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own trial
contrary to the advice of his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain
the United States legal system to him than any consular official would have been.34
The Court also concluded that the Vienna Convention did not provide a private right
of action to a foreign state to set aside a criminal conviction against one of its nationals
for violations of consular notification. In addition, the Court found that the Eleventh
Amendment provided a separate reason why Paraguay's suit should not succeed, and it
rejected the standing of the Consul General of Paraguay, as of Paraguay, to bring a
section 1983 suit.
Although the Court was apprised of the indication of interim measures by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and an amicus brief submitted by law professors had elaborated
the implications of noncompliance with this Order in some detail, the Court did not
address the international legal dimension at any length. The majority stated:
It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are pending
before the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier. Nonetheless, this
Court must decide questions presented to it on the basis of law. The Executive
Branch, on the other hand, in exercising its authority over foreign relations may,
and in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussion with Paraguay. Last night the
"Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 49-51 (citations omitted).
"Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1354 (1998).
'Id. at 1355.
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Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay
Breard's execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that
is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice
for him.35
Justice Breyer, dissenting, remarked that "[in]ore time would likely mean additional
briefing and argument, perhaps, for example,'on the potential relevance of proceedings
in an international forum."
3 6
The Governor of Virginia refused to issue a stay. In a statement issued on April 14,
1998, he said:
It has been stipulated by both the prosecution and Mr. Breard that he was not
notified of his ability to contact his consulate as required under the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations. The Republic of Paraguay has brought a proceeding in
the International Court ofJustice, claiming that foreign tribunal has jurisdiction to
stay his execution, void his conviction, and order a new trial. The International
Court of Justice has issued an "indication of provisional measures" to have Mr.
Breard's execution delayed while it considers the merits of Paraguay's claims. It is
my understanding that the International Court's proceeding could take years to
reach conclusion.
Both Mr. Breard and the Republic of Paraguay filed cases concerning this matter
before the U.S. Supreme Court. At the request of the Court, the U.S. Department
ofJustice has argued forcefully that the rulings of the International Court ofJustice
are not enforceable by the courts of the United States, that the International Court
of Justice has no[ ] authority to intervene in the criminal justice system of the
Commonwealth of Virginia or any other state, and that the Supreme Court should
not intervene in this matter. At the same time, the Secretary of State has requested
that I stay Mr. Breard's execution. The Secretary specifically raises concern "about
the possible negative consequences for the many U.S. citizens who live and travel
abroad."
The concerns expressed by the Secretary of State are due great respect and I have
given them serious consideration. However, it is but one of the various concerns
that I must take into consideration in reaching my decision.
As Governor of Virginia my first duty is to ensure that those who reside within
our borders-both American citizens and foreign nationals-may conduct their
lives free from the fear of crime. Our criminal justice system is designed to provide
the greatest degree of safety for law abiding citizens and foreign visitors alike while
ensuring substantial procedural safeguards to those accused of crime. Indeed, in
this case Mr. Breard received all of the procedural safeguards that any American
citizen would receive.
I am concerned that to delay Mr. Breard's execution so that the International
Court ofJustice may review this matter would have the practical effect of transferring
responsibility from the courts of the Commonwealth and the United States to the
International Court. Should the International Court resolve this matter in Paraguay's
favor, it would be difficult, having delayed the execution so that the International
Court could consider the case, to then carry[ ]out the jury's sentence despite the
rulings [of] the International Court.
The U.S. Department ofJustice, together with Virginia's Attorney General, make
a compelling case that the International Court ofJustice has no authority to interfere
with our criminal justice system. Indeed, the safety of those residing in the Common-
wealth of Virginia is not the responsibility of the International Court of Justice. It
S Id at 1356.
36Id1 at 1357.
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is my responsibility and the responsibility of law enforcement and judicial officials
throughout the Commonwealth. I cannot cede such responsibility to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
Mr. Breard having committed a heinous and depraved murder, his guilt being
unquestioned, and the legal issues being resolved against him, and the U.S. Supreme
Court having denied the petitions of Breard and Paraguay, I find no reason to
interfere with his sentence. Accordingly, I decline to do so.
37
The International Court ofJustice remains seised of the case initiated by Paraguay.
JONATHAN I. CHARNEY AND W. MICHAEL REISMAN
THE ABIDING RELEVANCE OF FEDERALISM TO U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
The international law community has heavily criticized the United States' handling of
the Breard case. These criticisms are understandable. Perhaps because of the rush of
time, the explanations by the Department ofJustice and the Supreme Court for failing
to stop Breard's execution brushed over important issues of domestic and international
law. In addition, Virginia's decision to proceed with the execution, and the federal
Government's decision not to block it, may have reflected insufficient respect for interna-
tional law and institutions. These decisions may also adversely affect U.S. relations with
other nations and weaken consular protection of U.S. citizens abroad. These criticisms,
however, tell only part of the story. In particular, they do not consider countervailing
considerations grounded in the Constitution's allocation of authority between the federal
and state governments.
Conventional wisdom tells us that this country's federal structure is irrelevant to the
national Government's exercise of its foreign relations powers. This conventional wisdom
is reflected in old Supreme Court dicta.' It also pervades foreign relations scholarship.
It underlies, for example, the claims that federal courts should apply customary interna-
tional law as self-executing federal common law that trumps state law; 2 that the treaty
makers can make supreme federal law even if otherwise beyond the authority of the
federal Government;3 and that courts, on their own initiative, should invalidate state
laws affecting foreign relations under a "dormant" preemption rationale.4
7 Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore
Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14, 1998).
' See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is not shared by the
States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937) ("[uIn respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State
. . does not exist."); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the several
States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but
one people, one nation, one power."); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316
(1936) ("[S]ince the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have been
carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other
source.").
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of international Law, 1994 Sup.
CT. REV. 295, 304, 332 n.109; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv.
1555, 1559 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1846-
47 (1998).
'See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRs AND THE UNIrrED STATES CONSITrTION 191, 197 (2d ed. 1996)
("At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign relations, the
states 'do not exist.' "); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and
"Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530 (1991); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of
RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 46-48 (1997).
' See, e.g., Daniel Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of
International Choice of Law, 74 IoWA L. REv. 165, 167, 182-83 (1988);John Norton Moore, Federalism andForeign
1998]
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